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I.

Abstract
Latin America is the locus of various policy experiments and social movements, where

political and economic leaders have vacillated between prioritizing neoliberalism and social
security since the 1960s. Scholars have observed Latin American leftist governments for viable
alternatives to neoliberal economics, but such projects have effectively failed to truly change the
course of economic development in Latin America (Weyland, 2010; Escobar, 2010). One of the
most salient contemporary instances of this ideological conflict has been the issue of land use
rights and neo-extractivism, particularly in mining conflicts in the Andes of South America. This
thesis posits that so-called leftist political leaders of Ecuador and Bolivia have directly supported
the durability of the neoliberal economic order in the mining industry, by molding political
institutions that appear to prioritize social rights, while in practice subscribing to the neoliberal
idea that prioritizing economic development over social and cultural rights will lead people to be
materially better off. As such, only by threatening the economic interests of the states can
community leaders advance indigenous and environmental causes. By examining the left-wing
Correa and Morales governments of Ecuador and Bolivia, this thesis demonstrates how leftist
Latin American nation-states, even those nominally committed to socialism and pluralism,
deepen their rhetorical acknowledgement of diverse cultures, and increase participation in the
political process, while at the same time maintaining the economic and material systems of
neoliberalism in the form of neo-extractivism.
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II.

Introduction
Latin America contains a diverse array of policy experiments and social movements

geared towards planned economics, sustainability, and social justice, yet overall neoliberal
economic development has prevailed throughout the continent. Following the election of several
leftist leaders such as Presidents Hugo Chavez, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, Luiz Inácio Lula
da Silva, Evo Morales and Rafael Correa in the 1990s and 2000s, scholars, politicians and
activists alike have looked towards Latin America with a hopeful eye.1 They examine the
democratic socialist “Pink tide” or “turn to the left” of the early 21st century in Latin America
for evidence of viable alternatives to the global capitalist system of neoliberal economics, which
has promoted free-market capitalist ideas of the Washington consensus, such as reducing state
authority through privatization, deregulation, and industrialization, since the 1980s and 1990s
(Encarnación, 2018; Escobar, 2010). Looking for alternatives to neoliberal development, they
examine whether leftist movements and politicians can change the neoliberal patterns of
industrial extractivism that have prevailed in Latin America. One of the most salient
contemporary instances of this ideological conflict has been the issue of land use rights and
extractivism, particularly in mining conflicts in the Andes of South America.
Generally, the so-called “post-neoliberal” projects of the political left are widely viewed
as having failed to succeed at the national level in Latin America, leading many scholars to
propose various theories as to why these projects failed, and prescriptions as to how governments
ought to proceed. Often, members of the political left blame isolated incidents and individual
leaders, while members of the political right theorize that post-neoliberalism is simply infeasible.

1

Chavez served as President of Venezuela from 1999 - 2013, Kirchner served in Argentina (2007 - 2015), Lula da
Silva served in Brazil (2003 - 2011), Morales served in Bolivia (2006 - Present-day 2018), and Correa served in
Ecuador (2007 - 2017).
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This thesis intervenes in the current debate by positing that so-called leftist political leaders of
Ecuador and Bolivia have actually directly supported the durability of the neoliberal economic
order in the mining industry, by molding political institutions that appear to prioritize social
rights, while in practice subscribing to the neoliberal idea that prioritizing economic
development over social rights will lead people to be materially better off. As such, only by
threatening the economic interests of the states can community leaders advance indigenous and
environmental causes. By examining the left-wing Correa and Morales governments of Ecuador
and Bolivia, this thesis demonstrates how leftist nation-states in Latin America, even those
nominally committed to socialism and pluralism, deepen their rhetorical acknowledgement of
diverse cultures, and increase participation in the political process, while at the same time
maintaining the economic and material systems of neoliberalism in the form of neo-extractivism.
The conflict between socialist and capitalist development in Latin America has been a
significant political issue since the 1960s. In the 1970s, as a response to the growing influence of
Marxism in the 1960s and polarization between working class and elite sectors, a series of
military-led authoritarian governments, promoting liberalism in the form of deregulation and
investment in heavy industry, spread throughout Latin America. Yet, largely due to the
subsequent economic debt crises of the 1980s in Latin America, these states witnessed a return to
civilian rule by the end of the 80s and early 90s. In the following struggle for state control, leftwing concern with authoritarian rule clashed with right-wing concern with union power, as well
as a general desire to improve the economy. In order to improve the economy, nations looking
for international loans were required to abide by neoliberal policies of structural adjustment.
Western leaders and international organizations promoted neoliberal reforms based on the free-
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market logic that removing the state from the market would allow markets to function more
efficiently, allowing the economy to grow and welfare to increase as a result.
Consequently, in the 1980s and 1990s, leaders in Latin America implemented neoliberal
market reforms, including deregulating labor and financial trade, cutting business taxes, and
privatizing agricultural industries (Sadasivam, 1997, p. 635). Many Latin American nations
underwent massive privatization of formerly state-owned enterprises, deregulation, and a
decentralization of power from the central government to regional leaders, largely elite members
of society who promoted pro-market, neoliberal reforms (Eaton, 2013, p. 422). In Ecuador and
Bolivia, decentralization played an additional role in supporting neoliberal privatization and
reducing the role of the state, as the state decided to delegate responsibility for public
expenditures to regional administrations and encouraged capitalistic competition for resources
between regions, often leading to concessions of local enterprises to private corporations and
furthering inequality between different regions (Eaton, 2013, p. 422).
However, as a result of these neoliberal reforms, income inequality increased,
unemployment increased with the loss of state jobs, and prices skyrocketed without food, oil and
service subsidies (Bray, 1999, p. 68; Kurtz, 2004, p. 269; Crisp & Kelly, 1999, p. 542). Because
these neoliberal policies failed to produce the industrial development and economic stability
which provided the impetus for their adoption, a period often referred to by academics as the
“‘long dark night of neoliberalism’” (Eaton, 2013, p. 422), 21st century Latin American politics
underwent a shift which scholars have referred to as “the Turn to the Left” (Escobar, 2010, p.
48). Political economic development has thus vacillated between neoliberalism and postneoliberalism for over fifty years in the region. This paper contends that leftist leaders
themselves have contributed to the durability of neoliberalism in Latin America by developing
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political conventions that allow them to support social and cultural rights in rhetoric while also
supporting neoliberal economic development in the form of neo-extractivism.
In the following sections, this study will proceed by addressing the methods and
limitations of this research. Afterwards, the literature review will discuss the main concepts of
this study, political institutions, neoliberalism, and neo-extractivism, and reviewing in more
detail previous scholarship relevant to this paper, before delving into the actual case studies
themselves. The case study section will focus on mining conflicts as a typical contemporary
example of when governments are faced with a decision between neoliberal economic business
ventures and social and cultural rights movements. The research is divided into two main
sections, focusing first on Ecuadorian political institutions, and then Ecuadorian mining conflict
over the use of land as an economic resource. The second section will discuss Bolivian political
institutions, and then examine mining conflicts in Bolivia, as well. Ecuador provides an example
in which the “leftist” government sides unequivocally with extractive corporations over the
community, whereas Bolivia provides an example in which locals successfully pushed the leftist
government to rescind the rights of an extractive corporation. Despite these differences, both
cases will demonstrate how the leftist regimes in Ecuador and Bolivia have prioritized neoliberal
economic logic over local and indigenous communities’ demands for social and cultural rights.
Afterwards, an analysis of the previous research will establish the connection between the
political institutions and economic outcomes of the mining conflicts. Finally, the conclusion
section of this thesis will discuss the findings of the analysis, in which both Correa and Morales
prioritize neoliberal economic development, and outline the broader implications of this inquiry.
III.

Methodology

Importance of Case Studies Chosen
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The focus of this thesis relies upon two case studies in Latin America, specifically early
21st century mining conflicts in Ecuador and Bolivia, under the Correa and Morales regimes,
respectively. The decision to focus on Latin America in order to study the relevant factors for
post-neoliberalism development can be neatly summarized by the words of Peruvian sociologist
Anı´bal Quijano who noted that “Latin America was the original space of the emergence of
modern/colonial capitalism,” while “today it is, at last, the very center of world resistance against
this pattern of power and of the production of alternatives to it” (2008, p. 3). The importance of
focusing upon these two countries is partially based on the fact that these two countries are both
widely recognized to contain two of the most radical left-leaning regimes in Latin America.
In discussing the “turn to the Left” of Latin America, Escobar writes that “the urge for a
re-orientation [sic]” of the political and economic institutions of neoliberalism was “most clear in
the cases of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador” (2010, p. 2) and other scholars similarly follow
suit in identifying Ecuador and Bolivia among the list of the most contestatory left-wing
governments in early 21st century Latin America (Eaton, 2013; Weyland, 2012). Political
scientist Kent Eaton posits that the “emergence of leftist presidents who reversed the market
reforms” in first decade of the twenty-first century was “advanced furthest in Venezuela,
Ecuador, and Bolivia” (Eaton 2013, p. 421). Based on his research of these three countries, Eaton
noted that at the turn of the century the governments of Chavez, Correa, and Morales initiated a
series of re-nationalization and recentralization of power in the central state government, while
promising to utilize this re-consolidated state power towards human rights and social justice,
indicating their commitment to left-wing politics (2013, p. 445). Weyland specifically evaluates
Bolivia and Ecuador by how closely they align to Venezuela as the ideal of “contestatory”
leftism (2010, p. 4). In like manner, in a NACLA report, Dr. Barry Cannon, specialist in
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developmentalism in Latin America, categorizes Latin American countries according to the
“threat level of the Left’s challenge to the neoliberal status quo”, designating Bolivia and
Ecuador, among others, as countries “where neoliberalism faced a medium-to-high threat,”
(2016, p. 330) This is the highest possible threat which Cannon accords, serving to mean that
“more radical departures from market-based policies were undertaken in a greater number of
areas of social and economic concern,” specifically in terms of nationalization, limiting bank
autonomy, introducing price controls and debt defaults, and land redistribution (Cannon 2016, p.
330). Thus, these strong cases of leftism would provide the best opportunity for studying the
attempts of leftist governments to challenge the current neoliberal economic order.
Additionally, as the ensuing analysis of the case studies will demonstrate, the selection of
these two case studies allows the analysis to demonstrate that although Correa and Morales have
acquired different reputations, as Morales is viewed as more radical, and have handled mining
conflicts differently, both governments utilize similar political tactics and economic logic which
allows this study to conclude that neoliberal logic is present in both of these leftist regimes.
Although Ecuador lacks the organized mining cooperatives of Bolivia, and Bolivia failed to fully
nationalize mining as Ecuador did, leading to varied outcomes in each state’s mining conflicts,
both regimes tend overall to be resistant to the demands of the people. Both case studies reveal
rhetorical ambiguities in each country’s national constitution, the use of militarism in support of
corporations, and the supremacy of state finance campaigns. Although Correa and Morales have
differed in their responses to mining conflicts, a comparison of these governments reveals that
both governments subscribe to similar forms of neoliberal economic logic.
Method
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This thesis proceeds by researching and drawing comparisons between left-wing
countries experiencing similar mining conflicts, and making connections between the political
tools used by both Presidents and the motivations behind their decisions. The focus on the
political conventions of each regime takes into account the constitutional frameworks, the
actions of the executive office, mining statues, and the judiciary. The analysis of the motivations
behind the political actions in the mining conflicts analyzes the claims for the rights to use land,
and the governments’ responses to these claims. In these cases, corporate economic actors push
for mining concessions in order to mine the land for commodifiable resources, whereas local
communities resist these efforts and claim communal rights to the land and also point to the
negative environmental impact of mining. The outcomes of these conflicts are characterized by
each government’s responses to these competing demands and the ultimate decision to award the
rights to land use to one group over the other(s).
By focusing on the connection between left-wing regimes and economic institutions, this
thesis builds upon extant theories about political institutions and capitalism by Hale (2005),
Weyland (2010), Taylor (2016), and Chakrabarty (2008), by positing a deliberate relationship
between left political leaders and the durability of neoliberal economics. This thesis also differs
from many other scholars by applying such theories to Latin America, but is connected to these
other scholars by remaining focused on formerly colonized populations. Moreover, while many
other scholars have discussed the post-neoliberal potential of leftist regimes in 21st century Latin
America, and many have analyzed the failures of these governments to challenge neoliberalism,
this thesis analyzes specific mining conflicts which show the ways in which left-wing political
regimes are directly responsible for the prevalence of neoliberalism in certain Latin American
nations, rather than simply pointing to failures of personal leadership, or structuralist arguments
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about the impotence of post-neoliberal systems in general. By analyzing the connection between
the political regimes of post-colonial Latin America and neoliberal economics, this thesis
provides a novel contribution to postcolonial studies and studies of international political
economy more broadly.
Limitations
This thesis is primarily focused on solely two countries in Latin America in one time
period. Within these two countries, only a handful of conflicts within the mining industry
specifically are analyzed. Other conflicts may provide more nuances, trends, and possibilities,
such as isolated victories by local movements, which could challenge the extent of the
applicability of this thesis. Similarly, studies of the conflicts between the people, the
government, and corporations in other industries within these countries, such as the oil and gas
industries, logging industries, and non-traditional sectors such as fair trade, biofuels and
horticultural industries, could provide more support for this thesis, but such a large endeavor is
beyond the resources and scope of this study. As this study has limited its focus to two countries
in one region, it is important to acknowledge that future studies of leftist political systems in
other regions of the world should also be used to analyze whether or not such leaders are able or
willing to dismantle neoliberal economics and forge post-neoliberal institutions.
In limiting the focus of this study to a narrow time period at the turn of the 21st century,
this thesis can only provide an analysis based on the political forces and economic trends present
at the time. At the time of writing, the Correa government is no longer in place, while the
Morales government is completing its final term in office, demonstrating greater durability. In
the Latin American region as a whole, the turn to the left of the early 21st century which had
been dubbed the “Pink tide” appears to have lost momentum and Latin America is experiencing
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a return to the right or “New Right,” with neoliberal regimes replacing leftist leaders in the
2010s, including right-wing President Moreno in Ecuador who replaced Correa. Thus, it will be
difficult for studies in the immediate future to argue the continuity of the phenomenon discussed
in this thesis, which argues that even left-wing political actors have been failed to produce
alternative post-neoliberal economic outcomes and in fact directly contribute to neoliberal
industries, as few radical leftist regimes endure in Latin America, and as left-wing leaders are
replaced by leaders who support neoliberalism. For further research on this topic, then, scholars
may have to look towards regimes in regions outside of Latin America, such as Asia and Europe,
where experiments with state-led economic programs and democratic socialism continue to push
the boundaries of neoliberal free-market economics.
IV.

Literature Review

Key Concepts in Latin American Politics
Latin American politics has been the object of interest for several political scientists and
sociologists interested in the economics of development, as well as the broader issue of national
socioeconomic arrangement. In response to the various eras of political domination and
experimentation in Latin America, from imperialism to authoritarianism to socialism, scholarly
analysts have weighed in on the merits and feasibility of Latin America’s various governmental
systems and political ideologies, which have notorious relevance for the questions of indigenous
rights and environmental sustainability in developing Latin American nations. Between the main
political parties participating in regional and national elections, the main political approaches
vying for dominance in Latin America can be divided between supporters of neoliberalism and
proponents of post-neoliberalism. In political spheres, this conflict often takes the discussed as
right-wing versus left-wing politics. The historical divide between these two competing
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economic ideologies which define the political right and left wings in Latin America provides the
historical background for this thesis.
Neoliberal Economics
In this paper, it is argued that the global neoliberal economic order is sustained by
political institutions, as these institutions can be viewed as having been designed by and for the
benefit of neoliberal policies. Neoliberalism, a system of free-market logic, is defined by Kurt
Weyland as comprised of fiscal austerity measures, privatization, openness to foreign trade, and
deregulation (Weyland, 2004, p. 136). Neoliberalism is associated with the political right-wing;
as Barry Cannon explains, “the Latin American Right has coalesced around a neoliberal project”
based on the idea that free trade, foreign direct investment, the private sector, markets, and
competition “are the best way to solve pressing economic or social problems” (2016, p. 328). As
such, the neoliberal project can be well-defined as a free-market project of the political rightwing.
Furthermore, neoliberalism has specific consequences for indigenous land use rights and
environmental-related policy issues, such as state mining concessions which are the focus of this
thesis. Neoliberalism has been recognized as paving the way for corporate capital and
transnational agro-industries to use force and legally questionable means of circumvention to
acquire and convert large areas of land towards large-scale export-production (Kay, 2015, p. 81).
Specifically, Cristobal Kay notes that “mining activities, aquaculture...and forest plantations are
depleting and polluting fresh water resources” (2015, p. 79). Going forwards, Kay hypothesizes
that “agribusinesses, supermarkets, financial capital and 'translatina' conglomerates will continue
to extend their domination over the Latin American rural landscape and beyond” (Kay, 2015, p.
80). These processes are known as and referred to by many scholars as neo-extractivism. Kay
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directly connects the pro-capital liberalization policies of neoliberalism to the deterioration of
rural labor conditions and environmental degradation (2015, p. 76-77). In this way, the right
wing of Latin American politics has been associated with unsustainable, mass extractivism
which has been enabled by neoliberal policies.
Global Neoliberal Economics
Internationally, the global neoliberal economic regime has been theorized to exert
pressure on nation-states. Similar to Chakrabarty’s connection of political and economic
institutions, Dave Hill and Ravi Kumar expounded upon the socializing effect of the global
economic regime (2012). As summarized in their abstract, in analyzing instances of “global,
national and local neoliberalisation of...education,” these authors reveal the “machinations,
agenda and impacts of the privatising and 'merchandisation' of education by the World Bank, the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), biased think tanks, global and national
corporations and capital, and the full political spectrum of Neoliberal governments” (Hill, 2012).
As a result of the socializing power of global economic regimes, according to Hill and Kumar,
the “consequences of implementing policies that include privatization...and the involvement of
banks and private enterprises with the purpose of optimizing profits” includes such effects as
deepened racial divisions, gendered social classes, and the role and shape of markets and
education in the era of globalised Capitalism (Hill, 2012, p. 8).
Relatedly, other scholars have touched upon the relationship between political regimes
and the global neoliberal economic regime, in various works. For example, Vincent Navarro
worked to synthesize a wide variety of scholarship on neoliberalism and globalism, in order to
find that “the international economic order of ‘capitalism without borders’” and associated
“political regimes” affected population health (2007, p. 1). Navarro identifies ways in which the
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global neoliberal order shapes political institutions, which in turn shape public health. Many
other scholars have also discussed the ways in which global neoliberalism has shaped national
political issues, but fewer have analyzed the specific instances and mechanisms by which leftist
national political leaders have sustained the logic of neoliberal economics (Coburn, 2004;
Muntaner, Lynch, and Smith, 2001; Navarro and Muntaner, 2004). The thesis in this study
attempts to show how left-wing political actors have worked to support neoliberal economic
outcomes.
Post-Neoliberalism
Post-neoliberalism2, by contrast, has been described by Escobar as “a space/time when
social life is no longer seen as...determined by the constructs of economy, individual,
instrumental rationality, private property, and so forth as characteristics of liberalism modernity”
(Escobar, 2010, p. 12), a new non-capitalist paradigm of conceiving of social organization. As
Escobar explains, with reference to political scientist Benjamin Arditi’s work, the political left is
associated with post-neoliberalism, generally aiming to alter the status quo, go beyond classic
neoliberalism, and “enact anti-neoliberal policies” (2010, p. 6). For Escobar, post-neoliberalism
describes any and all political projects that deviate from and/or counter the hegemony of
neoliberalism and do not attempt to claim that there is a singular viable form of economic
development. In other words, post-neoliberalism is the idea that “the economy is not essentially
or naturally capitalist, societies are not naturally liberal, and the state is not the only way of
instituting social power as we have imagined it to be” (Escobar 2010, p. 12). Hence, in
opposition to neoliberalism, post-neoliberalism can take the form of pro-labor policies,

2

‘Post-neoliberalism’ and ‘post-liberalism’ are used interchangeably in political scholarship (Escobar, 2010). In this
work, ‘post-neoliberalism’ will be used to refer to the concept, in order to emphasize its direct antithetical
relationship to neoliberalism.

Mendez 15

regulation of industry, and state intervention in the economy, and the prioritization of social
justice. Often, the political campaigns of the political left-wing promote such post-neoliberal
policies of economic development.
The left wing relationship to economic policy is more divided than that of the right,
between moderate and radical post-neoliberal approaches, a difference which can be found both
cross-nationally as well as between the state-level and grassroots level of politics. Even scholars
in favor of neoliberalism recognize the left as a coalition of different groups with varying
commitments to post-liberal transformation. In analyzing the “pink,” or left, governments of 21st
century Latin America, Weyland argues that there are two main camps of leftist governance,
differentiated by their moderate, or realist, versus radical, activist contestation of neoliberalism
(2010, p. 3). The relatively radical movements within the left are seen as having a greater
commitment to post-neoliberalism. In a parallel manner, radical leftist movements with a greater
commitment to post-neoliberalism are committed to finding an environmentally sustainable
approach to development.
However, by and large, post-neoliberal projects are widely seen by both proponents and
opponents as having failed to materialize (Escobar, 2010; Weyland, 2004). For example, in an
analysis of “the Bolivian experiment in postneoliberal politics,” George Gray Molina argues that
Morales’ government, “although postneoliberal in the chronological sense, may not be
sufficiently postneoliberal in raising labor and welfare standards at home and transforming
Bolivia’s role in the global economy” (Weyland, 2010, p. 57). Regarding the extent to which
movements and actors within the left have been committed to post-neoliberalism, many scholars
have found that post-liberalism is an ideal which has yet to be realized or become politically
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dominant (Kay, 2015; Escobar, 2010; Weyland, 2010). Leftist leaders who “promised a new
post-neoliberal development agenda,” became quite moderate in practice (Kay 2015, p. 78).
Neo-Extractivism
In discussing the relationship between neoliberalism and the environment, scholarship
has recognized that the consequences of industrial economies of scale, deregulation, and private
corporations has been large-scale, unsustainable extractivism of natural resources for export to
commodity markets. This process of export-oriented industrial extractivism, which Latin
American governments often nationalize and utilize in order to increase state revenues, has been
termed “neo-extractivism” (Kay, 2015, p. 78). Interestingly, Kay writes that “the 'pink' tide in
Latin America,” rather than bring about post-neoliberal development, has more often than not
“been a neo-developmentalist strategy which has continued with the neo-extractivist (largely in
mining, agriculture, forestry and fisheries) export-oriented economic process of the previous
neoliberal governments” (Kay, 2015, p. 78). In fact, according to Kay, the leftist governments of
the pink tide have achieved export-oriented neo-extractivism “sometimes paradoxically with
greater intensity and success” (Kay, 2015, p. 78). This paradox merits further and more detailed
examination.
Mining has comprised a large part of neo-extractivism in Latin America. In his
exploration of neo-extractivism, Kay writes that “the shift to non- traditional exports was mainly
driven by new capitalist entrepreneurs originating from, or linked to, the mining, industrial,
commercial and financial sectors” (2015, p. 75), demonstrating the significant position of mining
corporations. Escobar characterizes Ecuador under Correa as a nation “between neodevelopmentalism and post-development” (2010, p. 20). In a more detailed description of
Ecuador, though, Escobar points out that Correa’s policy strategy consists of using mining,
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among other sectors, to “amplify the economic the economic growth that can sustain human
development,” indicating adherence to neoliberal free-market logic (2010, p. 73). Going further,
Escobar characterizes Correa’s strategic sectors, including mining, as “problematic” due to the
fact that “they seem exempt from the cultural and environmental criteria” of the leftist ideals that
were supposed to frame the new constitution (2010,, p. 22). Thus, Escobar touches upon the
paradox of Correa’s leftist regime, stating how indigenous communities “see Correa’s
government as upholding an alternative modernization based on academic knowledge, with
insufficient participation of indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities, and workers despite its antineoliberal stances” (2010, p. 24).
In analyzing Bolivia’s experiences with mining and neo-extractivism, Escobar argues that
there is stronger reason to believe that there is potential for post-neoliberal development under
Morales’ government (2010, p. 26). Yet, the reason cited for this hypothesis is actually due to the
prevalence of popular protests and civil disobedience by indigenous communities fighting the
political economic system of “representative democracy and private property” (Escobar, 2010,
p. 30). Ironically, the resurgence of these popular uprisings has been attributed to the increase of
indigenous migrants to urban areas who were “displaced from mining and agricultural
livelihoods by neo-liberal reforms” (Escobar, 2010, p. 30). Hence, neoliberal mining activity has
also been antagonistic to indigenous communities in Bolivia. Still, academic scholarship lacks
much in depth analysis isolating the neo-extractivist mining in Ecuador and Bolivia.
Competing Theories
Various theoretical explanations exist in previous scholarship concerning both the
shortcomings of post-neoliberal movements, as well as the relationship between politics and
economics in general. These theories include both supporters and detractors at neoliberalism.
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Scholars provide different explanation as to why post-neoliberalism may have as of yet
failed to materialize in Latin America. Those scholars more supportive of neoliberalism, such as
Kurt Weyland, theorize that the radicalism of many strains of post-neoliberalism lacks prudence,
and instead praises the more moderate left which compromises within the neoliberal structure to
be superior, in that its accomplishments “stand on a more solid foundation and...accumulate over
time” (2010, p. 13). Following a different strain of thought, less supportive of neoliberalism,
Cristobal Kay posits that capitalist concepts such as socioeconomic stratification, social and
political consciousness, capital accumulation, surplus value, and processes of exploitation and
domination “bring into sharper focus the key contradictions and problems facing the rural
economy and society...relevant for understanding contemporary processes of globalization and
their problems” (2015, pp. 79-80). Though Kay stops short of producing a specific model for
how such economic processes are relevant for politics, he proposes that “the agrarian question
today has to be framed beyond the nation state so as to be able to contest the current neoliberal
global corporate...regime, although the nation state remains the most immediately viable space of
contestation (2015, p. 81).” Thus, Kay advances the concept of the problem and limits of the left
political regime. Going even further, other scholars have discussed the “erosion of [Latin
American governments’] sovereignty due to globalization” as well (Pierre and Peters, 2010;
Puig, 2014, p. 76).
Further discussing the relationships between Latin American political regimes and
economic institutions, scholars Hale and Vogt have discussed how neoliberal multiculturalism,
which combines free-market economics with policies supporting civil rights, allows for diversity
and identity politics to flourish in Central America, without the need for altering the economic
system (Hale, 2005; Vogt, 2015). Specifically, Hale identifies policies of decentralization,
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reduction of the role of the state, and minimal democratization, with a new focus on human
rights, as neoliberal multiculturalism (Hale, 2005, p. 12). While some analysts had begun to
argue in the early 1990s and 2000s stages of the “Pink tide” that indigenous rights and
sustainable progress were advancing, make such claims that “indigenous peoples have been
empowered by alliances with actors...an international regime on the rights of indigenous peoples,
the adoption of a new jurisprudence with regard to indigenous peoples, and the creation of
autonomous territories (Puig, 2014, p. 74). Yet, analyses of more recent developments continue
to provide support for Hale’s theory of neoliberal multiculturalism, which contends that
“indigenous organizations win important battles of cultural rights only to find themselves mired
in the painstaking, technical, administrative and highly inequitable negotiations for resources and
political power that follow” (Hale, 2005, p. 13). Even Puig admitted the limits of these
developments, stating that “while progress is tangible, the events of the past two decades indicate
the limits of the permeability of Latin American polyarchies” (2012, p. 74). As Eaton discusses,
early 21st century leftist presidents actually reversed the politics of decentralization which
afforded early gains in indigenous political autonomy, recentralizing power in the executive
branch of the nation-state (Eaton, 2013). Therefore, neoliberal multiculturalism provides a
specific theory for the mechanism through which leftist political regimes can sustain economic
regimes in Latin American countries.
More broadly, scholars such as Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor and journalist Robert Borden
put forward systemic political theories that may also illuminate the forces at work in Latin
American politics. Some scholars and activists outright decry the viability of the current political
economic world order, such as cynical activist campaigns which maintained that “if voting
changed anything, they would make it illegal” (Borden, 1976, p. 7). Offering more detailed
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criticisms of modern political institutions, Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor posits that the personal
decisions of actors in positions of power within the “political establishment” sustain the status
quo, due to the fact that these actors’ political conclusions are shaped by experiences of socioeconomic privilege (2016, p. 7). Scathingly, Taylor writes that “Elected officials obscure their
actions under a cloak of imaginary...solidarity, while ignoring their role as arbiters of political
power who willingly operate in a political terrain designed to exploit and oppress...other working
class people” (2016, p. 79). Applying such a theory to Latin American politics would look to the
ways in which the backgrounds of leaders such as Correa and Morales inhibited the willingness
of such leaders to challenge the neoliberal status quo.
As the previous section has shown, scholars have discussed the history and viability of
neoliberalism and neo-extractivism in Latin America. Much scholarship has also demonstrated
the dialectical relationship of neoliberalism to the rise of leftist regimes in Latin America, which
were grew and achieved success out of popular discontent with neoliberal economics. While
there is widespread agreement that the leftist, post-neoliberal project has failed to materialize in
Latin America, less scholarship has attempted to synthesize and analyze the instances in which
the left-wing has directly sustained the neoliberal economic order. The following case studies
and analysis attempts to intervene in these discussions of Latin American politics and neoliberal
economics by establishing a direct relationship between the left-leaning Presidents Correa and
Morales, and the success of neoliberal economic development projects in Ecuador and Bolivia.
V.

Case Study: Ecuador
From his election in 2006 to 2017, with the support of the Alianza Pais party, Ecuador

was governed by democratic socialist President Rafael Correa, a left wing leader who rode to
power on the promise of reversing the neo-liberal policies of deregulation and privatization of
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the Washington Consensus (Eaton 2013). By creating a new constitution, nationalizing important
industries, and implementing social welfare programs, Ecuador’s government closely adhered to
the typical tenets of leftist socialist governance.
Constitutional Law
In regards to the environment, Ecuador’s 2008 constitution contains several postneoliberal inspired articles pertaining to indigenous rights and sustainable development. Towards
sustainability, Title VII of the constitution guarantees sustainable development that “is
environmentally balanced and respectful of cultural diversity, conserves biodiversity and the
natural regeneration capacity of ecosystems, and ensures meeting the needs of present and future
generations.” Article 57 specifically states that indigenous communities lands are “immune from
seizure and indivisible,” and requires “free prior informed consultation on the plans and
programs for prospecting, producing and marketing nonrenewable resources located on their
lands and which could have an environmental or cultural impact on them; to participate in the
profits earned from these projects and to receive compensation for social, cultural and
environmental damages caused to them.”3 These legal conventions force prospectors to conduct
environmental impact studies before they can exploit indigenous land.
However, the constitution goes on to say that “if consent of the consulted community is
not obtained, steps provided for by the Constitution and the law shall be taken.” The UN
convention similarly reinforces this concept, by conferring to the state the responsibility to
“provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress” for any action which deprives the
indigenous of their lands or resources. However, conflict ensues when communities do not

3

Parallelly, the 2008 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples states in Article 10 that indigenous lands
cannot be taken “without the free, prior and informed consent” of the affected peoples. Both Ecuador and Bolivia
have ratified this international convention.
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provide their consent; thereafter the government exercises its discretion as provided for by the
constitution, by granting the use of the land irrespective of the results of the impact studies and
desires of the community.
Mining Law
As a result, since coming to power, the leftist government in Ecuador has been the
subject of intense criticism, due to conflicts with indigenous and local communities over rights to
land use. One of the most heated conflicts that has plagued Correa’s administration is the dispute
between local communities and extractive mining corporations, often transnational or foreign
owned and export-oriented. Though in 2010 Ecuador’s mineral sector was nationalized in the
name of sovereignty and socialism, and entrusted to the direction of the state mining company
ENAMI, discontent with the actions of ENAMI and the continued large-scale extraction in its
entirety has culminated in tense disputes, pitting organized responses by community members
against the government and corporations. In 2013, in an attempt to attract foreign investment,
Congress amended the Mining Law, creating a pro-foreign investment law that fast tracks permit
granting, caps the amount of royalties companies must pay, and suspends tax requirements until
companies have recovered their investment (Wacaster, 2013, p. 1). Since then, grants of mining
concessions have abounded.
Some indigenous rights coalitions have pursued judicial redress for mining concessions.
In 2008, Ecuador’s Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities, or CONAIE, filed a suit in
constitutional court to ask for a law to enforce pre-legislative consultation for mining projects
(Alvaro, 2013). Later, ECUARUNARI, Ecuador's Confederation of Peoples of Kichwa
Nationality, filed a lawsuit in Ecuador to challenge the constitutionality of the 2013 mining law,
on the grounds of insufficient consultation with indigenous people living in areas with mining
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projects, and additionally aimed to prevent mining in the Andes by appealing to international
courts, such as the Human Rights Commission and Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(Alvaro, 2013). During Correa’s regime, these suits did not alleviate the mining concessions.
Conflict in Intag Region Junin Community
Intag, a river-valley region of northern Ecuador containing a cloud-forest reserve which
is one of the world’s richest zones of biodiversity, has been the locus of a heated and typical
conflict over mining concessions (Pothier, 2015). In 2013, ENAMI partnered with CODELCO,
the Chilean national mining company, with financial backing from China, to explore the Intag
region and construct a large-scale, open-pit copper mine (Kuecker, 2013). Open-pit mining in
particular is widely linked to environmental degradation in the form of erosion, sinkhole
formation, loss of biodiversity and groundwater contamination (Monjezi, 2008), as such the
community has opposed it since the 1990s. In the past, the community fought foreign firms
during the rise of neoliberalism; now, it faces its own purportedly anti-neoliberal, leftist
government.
In opposition to ENIMA and CODELCO in Intag, the communities used a variety of
direct actions, which received nationwide popular support. In 2013 they successfully kept
ENAMI out of the community with a road blockade, which Kuecker, co-founder of the Intag
Solidarity Network, calls “an age-old peasant community tactic” (2013). The people have formed
a proactive grassroots organization, Coordinadora Zonal de Intag, to protect the cloud forest,
promote alternative economic development, and eradicate large-scale mining entirely (Kuecker,
2013). They have opposed construction from the inception of the exploration, unequivocally
withholding their consent.
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In response to the Intag conflict, the Correa government pushed back against the
communities with a variety of legislative methods to neutralize and criminalize the opposition. In
a report by Defensoría del Pueblo de Ecuador, human rights investigators found that these
personal attacks are two-pronged, comprised of attacks on individuals as well as institutionalized
criminalization. For instance, Correa personally led a public attack on Sabatina television against
leaders of the Intag movement, calling them “anti-democratic” and manipulative intellectuals
(Kuecker). In other interviews, labeled environmentalists as “infantile,” “romantics,” and
“terrorists” (Billo, 2015).
In addition, the state has resorted to far more violent methods, using the police and
military on the grounds of national security. For example, the police monitor people’s daily
movements and asked for identification (Billo, 2015). In April 2014, 300 national police
accompanied the ENAMI into Intag to stop protesters (Billo, 2015). Also in Intag, Javier
Ramírez, the former president of the community, was accused of injuring mining employees
during anti-mining protests, detained by police, and jailed for 10 months before being charged
(Billo, 2015). He was only charged after-the-fact for inciting violence (Billo, 2015). In response
to these government aggressions, according to Ramirez’s wife, “People are afraid of protesting
now. [They] don’t know what is going to happen,” and the general perception is that “it’s all
political” (Pothier, 2015).
Conflict in the Amazon Shuar Community
In 2016, in Ecuador’s Southern Amazonian region, the indigenous leaders came together
to oppose yet another large-scale Chinese-backed mining project, an open-pit mine by Chinese
company EXSA, located in the lands of the Shuar community (Brown, 2017). The community
has, as in Intag, led huge protests to physically obstruct the project. The leaders of this
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opposition also attempt to make appeals to legal principles. Carlos Mazabanda, field coordinator
of the NGO Amazon Watch, declared in an interview with Mongabay that even “if you need
those natural resources, you still need to strictly comply with the constitutional mandates. You
can’t choose which rights to comply with and which ones not too,” and Tuntiak Katan, Shuar
leader and member of COICA, the Coordinator of the Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon
Basin, similarly maintained in an interview with Mongabay that, “the truth is we have the best
constitution in the world, but the worst constitution in its application in daily life,” (Brown,
2017).
In 2016, police raided the headquarters of the Shuar Federation detained the president,
Agustin Wachapá, reportedly beating him in front of his wife before destroying the office and
jailing him, also without formal charges (Ling, 2017). As with Ramirez, Wachapa was only later
charged for inciting violence (Ling, 2017). Former president of CONAIE and leader of the
Andean Kichwa Peoples portended in an interview with Intercontinental Cry that, "The
government of Rafael Correa is pushing the Armed Forces to play a role that we have never seen
before, not even in times of dictatorship" (Ling, 2017).
Additional Forms of Government Response
More broadly, in 2013, the government has passed a law defining road blockades as acts
of terrorism (Kuecker, 2013). In 2009, the state temporarily shut down the environmental
organization, Accíon Ecológica, opposing mining projects (Billo, 2015). In 2013, Correa’s
government shut down also closed Fundación Pachamama, human rights and environmental
organization for “endangering public peace and state security” (Billo, 2015). Correa has
consistently justified these acts by declaring a state of emergency, thereby allowing for the
suspension of rights such as freedom of assembly, movement, and due process (Ling 2017), but
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this state of emergency is based on the economic reality that the state remains dependent on
foreign investment. Discussing Correa, the Financial Times commented that his mining policy
appears to be “aimed at inking new contracts with foreign investors, not at erasing them”
(Schipani, August 3, 2012). Correa’s consistent courtship of foreign mining is heavily indicative
of his short-term economic motivation.
In 2006, Correa promoted long discussions with Canadian miners, using his national
press to promote alliance, holding that “Canada has always been a good friend of Ecuador.”
(Moore, 2009). In 2015, in an interview with Forbes, Correa declared quite unabashedly “that
Ecuador is a wonderful place to invest, with a lot of opportunities for investors” (Noer, 2015).
Correa even went on to state that while Ecuador’s use of the dollar was a “huge disadvantage,”
posing macroeconomic difficulties for the state by precluding currency devaluation, the dollar
was nevertheless “a good thing, a huge advantage at the same time for investors, especially
American investors” (Noer, 2015). As a result, while some observers heralded Correa’s leftist
government for its alternative development (Escobar, 2010), and “‘post-neoliberal’ populism”
(Billo, 2015), others have accused his regime of full-blown “militarized neoliberalism,” (Ling,
2017). Disillusioned, leaders commented that “Correa has changed and now all he wants is to
exploit all our natural resources. It is a terrible let-down. We voted for him, we believed in him,
and now we want him to go,” (Pothier, 2015).
As the above case study has shown, the Ecuadorian government under Correa developed
several legal institutions for the support of environmental and cultural rights, yet at the same time
managed to circumvent these state priorities when faced with conflicts over land use. In each of
the above examples, the Correa government conceded land to foreign industrial extraction
corporations. In the coming analysis, this paper engages further with the concessions of the
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Correa regime and the implications of these economic outcomes for scholarly understandings of
leftist governments in Latin America.
VI.

Case Study: Bolivia
In 2006, indigenous leader Evo Morales was democratically elected to the Presidency of

Bolivia, turning heads around the world, largely due to his affiliation with MAS, or the
Movement Towards Socialism. In a nation where around 70% of the population is of indigenous
descent (Escobar, 2010, p. 27), Morales’ Presidency was seen as a true testament to democracy,
and his critique of neoliberalism more broadly provided much hope to the populace in general.
Even more so than in Ecuador, Morales’ democratic socialist government provided hope to both
the grassroots and scholars around the world that a post-liberal state, breaking the seemingly
inescapable neo-extractive and neo-developmental bonds of neo-liberalism inherited from the
20th Century. Like Ecuador, Morales moved to reverse the market reforms of the Washington
Consensus, through nationalization and expropriation, and social transfer programs. Molina
unequivocally labeled Bolivia as “an experiment in postneoliberal politics,” charting a “third
way” with respect other governments in Latin America such as Chile and Venezuela (Weyland,
2010, p. 57). Indeed, Bolivia has been analyzed as a way “to go beyond the Right-Left political
spectrum” to envision a truly decolonial, post-liberal, post-modern political space (Escobar,
2010, p. 26).
Constitutional Law
In 2009, Bolivia rewrote its constitution to reflect the new goals of the socialist
government. In addressing the issue of land rights in relation to environmentalism and
development, Bolivia appears to follow conventions of indigenous land recognition; Article 342
holds that the State and populace must “conserve, protect and use natural resources and the

Mendez 28

biodiversity in a sustainable manner,” and Article 343 gives the population “the right to
participate in environmental management, and to be consulted and informed prior to decisions
that could affect the quality of the environment.” The constitution also explicitly requires
“applications of systems of evaluation of environmental impact.” However, Article 345 holds
that the State will regulate the production of all matters affecting health and the environment,
Article 346 holds that the conservation and use of natural assets “shall be the responsibility and
exclusive authority of the State,” and Article 355 goes so far as to declare the industrialization
and sale of natural resources are priorities of the State. Furthermore, in contrast to Ecuador,
Article 352 maintains that the exploitation of natural resources will be subject to a process of
free, prior, and informed “consultation with the affected population,” rather than the consent of
the population, as in Ecuador. To this non-committal end, the Bolivian government states
generally that “Citizen participation is guaranteed...and the conservation of ecosystems shall be
promoted, in accordance with the Constitution and the law.” The constitution of Bolivia thus
solidifies the supremacy of central State discretion, and the law has similarly increased the role
of the state to pursue anti-neoliberal measures.
Mining Law
In the name of anti-neoliberalism and protecting the sovereignty of Bolivia, the Morales
government nationalized several industries, wresting them from overtly private, foreign control.
Over time, Morales nationalized industries including natural gas, oil, pension funds,
telecommunications, and hydroelectricity (Achtenberg, 2012), but mining, which is 15% of
Bolivia’s GDP (Stratfor, 2012), for the most part remained largely in the private sector under
Morales, though he raised mining taxes in 2006 (Jamasmie, 2014). Over time, through the use of
the State’s constitutionally derived power, the State nationalized specific mines, and passed laws
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such as the 2014 Mining Law, which attempted to ban the ability of small cooperative miners,
comprising 35% of Bolivia’s mining sector (Jamasmie, 2014), from partnering with large firms,
and requiring that all future mining ventures seek approval from COMIBOL, the state’s mining
agency (Achtenberg, 2014). Conflicts over mining law have persisted from 2006 to 2016, when
striking miners ended up kidnapping and killing the Deputy of Internal Affairs Minister at a
roadblock near Panduro, during protests against a law that would tighten regulation of miners’
activities (Alto, 2018).
Conflict with Cooperative Miners
In Bolivia, a large conflict over mining nationalization took the form of a domestic desire
to increase transnational mining operations, rather than decrease as in Ecuador, and wrought
intense activism and opposition from the cooperatives. Bolivia’s mining sector is split between
the state, private sector, and cooperative sector. Though originally of a socialist and collectivist
nature, the cooperative sector of late is viewed as a hierarchical private enterprise, controlled by
elite groups of stockholders who subcontract to an exploited workforce (Achtenberg, 2014).
They are organized within a national federation, FENCONIM, which is part of MAS (Alto,
2018), and fought against the mining law of 2014 to protect their pre-existing arrangements with
private firms (Achtenberg, 2014).
The methods employed by FENCOMIN included diverse legal and direct actions. They
argued on constitutional grounds that the law recognizes plural mining, which can only be
protected if small miners are allowed to make mixed contracts with large businesses
(Achtenberg, 2014). In addition, thousands of cooperative miners participated in road blockades
which resulted in large economic damages, injuries, and even four casualties (Achtenberg, 2014).
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As a result, Morales amended the law to recognize pre-existing contracts, while maintaining that
future contracts would still be subject to the law (Achtenberg, 2014).
In response to the FENCOMIN demonstration, though partially successful, Morales took
swift legal measures to retaliate and circumscribe the mining cooperatives. For instance, Morales
closed COMIBOL operations, ordered the audits of several cooperative-private contracts,
declared that he would prosecute insufficient approvals of such contracts as treason, and fired the
Mining Minister (Achtenberg, 2014). He also stipulated that pre-existing contracts must be
negotiated to conform to the new law within 18 months (Achtenberg, 2014).
Conflict with Indigenous Communities
More environmentally concerned and indigenous land rights-based conflicts over mining
concerning land rights have also plagued Bolivia as in Ecuador, in the dispute over Mallku
Khota. In 2006, COMIBOL approved the transfer of mining concessions in Mallku Khota, a
silver deposit in Northern Bolivia which is home to 46 indigenous communities with territory
rights to the land, to South American Silver Corporation (SASC) a Canadian mining company
(Garces, July 2012). The company attempted to divide the communities by signing individual
community agreements for the surface rights, but were unable to purchase the consensus of the
broad community (Garces, July 2012). Additionally, the corporation has refused complete an
environmental impact study, argue that there are no perceived environmental risks with the
project, (Garces, June 2012). This is despite the fact that the region, which supplied water to the
Amazonian region, is going through a process of desertification, and mining projects require
large amounts of water (Garces, June 2012).
By 2012, the community organized several direct actions against the SASC concessions.
On May 28th, CONAMAQ, the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu, organized
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a March in Defense of the sacred lake of Mallku Khota, which departed from Mallku Khota en
route to La Paz (Garces, June 2012). More militantly, they have taken police and employee
hostages, organized protests, and used dynamite and trenches to physically impede SASC (AIN,
2012).
In response, the government at first resorted to police paramilitary resistance. The police
gassed indigenous communities (Garces, July 2012), protected SASC employees, and shot at
crowds, leading to the death of a community member (AIN, 2012). In the end, Morales
personally decided to open up a dialogue with the community (Toro Lanza, 2012), whose leaders
eventually signed an agreement which reversed the SASC’s mining concession, gave
compensation to injured community members, and protected protestors from legal action, even
those involved in taking hostages (AIN, 2012). COMIBOL thereafter took over the SASC’s
mining concessions (Schipani, August 3, 2012). Commenting on the belated decision to appease
the local community, the secretary of Bolivia’s national miners’ union said, “We have
nationalized what belongs to us. This was badly privatized back in the nineties, and badly
managed...Nothing but rubbish was being left behind for the Bolivian people,” (Schipani, August
3, 2012).
Conflict Between Cooperatives Miners and Traditional Miners
It is important to note that in the Mallku Khota conflict, the groups opposed to
SASC included both community members opposed to mining broadly, and cooperative members
interested in retaining domestic control over mining. Tension between these two groups have
characterized many of Bolivia’s mining conflicts, such as the 2006 conflict between minecompany employees and cooperative members at Huanuni in October 2006, in which 16 died
(Alto, 2018), and the 2012 conflict over nationalizing the tin and zinc mine of Colquiri. In
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Colquiri, mining workers in the traditional mining sector, represented by the Federated Union of
Bolivian Mine Workers (FSTMB), fought for the rights to mine a portion of Colquiri previously
dominated by cooperative miners in FENCOMIN (Stratfor, June 2012). The FSTMB workers
went on strike, and thousands of protestors set up blockades alongside the miners. Regarding
Morales’ hesitance to comply, Elizabeth Peredo, director of Fundacion Solon, Bolivian human
rights organization, argued that “governments [do not] have the ability to set more sustainable
policies to care for Mother Earth, despite the rhetoric that adorns the constitutions and legal
frameworks” (Harris, 2012). In response, the government moved to nationalize the mine, despite
FENCOMIN’s objections, in order to resolve the conflict and preserve productivity, without
having to make a broad policy statement (Stratfor, June 2012). In Bolivia, the pressure to
nationalize therefore comes from domestic groups in FSTMB who favor mining, and groups who
oppose mining on environmental and communal grounds, while the pressure to privatize also
comes from mining in FENCOMIN, as well as externally from foreign investors, and the
government has proven to be responsive to these social and political pressures.
Additional Forms of Government Response
In justifying the government’s deployment of law enforcement and nationalization tactics
of stepping in only when local conflicts over the land turn violent, Morales’ government is able
to rely on the new Constitution which specifically empowers the representative government to do
so in the public interest. Also relying on electoral popularity, Bolivia’s Minister of Finance held
that they “have a mandate as a government to recover everything that was ours and then
privatised during the neoliberal model of the late nineties” (Schipani, August 29, 2012). Still,
Morales provides further justification, using the rhetoric that the protests of the FENCOMIN
mining opposition to nationalization is “a political conspiracy, not a social demand” (Press TV,
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2016), which is a sort of anti-democratic accusation. Indeed, he used personal language to
describe the protesting miners as “cowardly,” while maintaining that he himself has “always
been open” to democratic institutions such as negotiation (Schipani, August 29, 2012). Still,
Morales also openly acknowledges that “certain foreign interests” (Press TV, 2016) have a role
role in shaping the outcomes of mining conflicts.
The decisions of the Morales government to nationalize certain mines can be viewed as
leftist leaning decisions, and certainly more so than Correa’s actions. The Financial Times
commented in 2012 that Morales’ government appears to be “aimed at giving the state a bigger
slice of the sector’s profits” and that “natural resources investors have become increasingly
worried when looking at Bolivia” (Schipani, August 3, 2012). Still, overall it can be said that
foreign investors and capitalists have not been particularly intimidated, and have been found to
remain engaged with Bolivia’s post-nationalization energy sector (Achtenberg, May 2012).
Analysts attribute this to Morales’ “non-confrontational,” “investor-friendly policies” and his
“willingness to boost private incentives to meet domestic energy needs” (Achtenberg, May
2012), insinuating that these are the true priorities of the government. For example, his
expropriation of Spain’s Red Electrica was followed by join appraiser to fairly compensate the
firm on the value of its investment (Achtenberg, May 2012). And indeed, COMIBOL’s chief
declared that although they were reviewing contracts “to make them beneficial for the Bolivian
state,” there “will still be private mining with no involvement of the state” (Schipani, August 29,
2012). As in Ecuador, economic analysts attribute these assuaging policies to dependency on
foreign investment, maintaining that “the country cannot afford the comprehensive
nationalization Morales is advocating” because Bolivia’s mining output could not be sustained
without foreign capital and technology (Stratfor, June 12, 2012), and its “only major source of
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revenue is its natural resource deposits” (Stratfor, June 8, 2012). Hence, despite its constitutional
sanctioning of nationalization, analysts have posited that “many of the country’s nationalizations
have been in name only” (Stratfor, June 8, 2012). Thus, reliance on foreign investment precludes
consistent nationalization policies, leading scholars to posit that Bolivia’s policy agenda has
proved insufficiently postneoliberal in terms of “transforming Bolivia’s role in the global
economy,” among other problems (Weyland, 2010, p. 57). Hence, while evidently responsive to
social movements Bolivia remains constricted by the demands of the global trade order.
As this case study has shown, the Bolivian government under Morales put in place
several legal institutions, similar to those of Ecuador, in order to indicate the leftist leader’s
commitment to environmental and cultural rights. Yet, despite these political conventions, the
Bolivian government often responded in ways antagonistic to the environmentalist and cultural
demands of those opposed to mining concessions. Although Morales conceded to domestic
protests against foreign industrial mining corporations, the government still demonstrated a
prioritization of economic goals over purported goals of social justice and sustainability. In the
following analysis, this paper engages further with the decisions of the Morales regime and their
implications for academic analyses of leftist regimes and neoliberalism in Latin America.
VII.

Analysis
In the earlier portion of this thesis, previous scholarship established the history of the

political left in Latin America and the durability of economic neoliberalism in the face of popular
discontent. The paradoxical tension between post-neoliberal grassroots movements and leftist
political campaigns in Latin America can be better understood by examining the direct
relationship between left political leaders and neoliberal economic outcomes in the mining
industry of Latin America. In the case studies of this paper, this study provided an in depth
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analysis of the actions of the leftist Correa and Morales regimes, in regards to mining conflicts in
Ecuador and Bolivia. In both of these cases, the leftist political leaders of Latin American
nations, who were democratically elected by people discontent with neoliberalism, directly
supported industrial mining interests and neo-extractive development strategies. Thus, both
leftist regimes actively worked to reinforce and sustain the global neoliberal economic order of
privatization and extraction. The hierarchical supremacy and assumed legitimacy of these largely
discursive and bureaucratic national institutions inhibited the power of leftist grassroots and
leftist government officials to challenge the existing global economic order, diluting their voices,
allowing leftist national governments to welcome global industrial extraction interests. In the
above case studies, both Correa and Morales indeed chose to prioritize the capitalization rather
than the preservation of natural resources, thereby undermining the concerns of grassroots
communities and leftist political leaders, suppressing civil liberties, and allowing for the neoextractivist developmental state and preventing communal, sustainable development alternatives.
Although the Morales industry eventually conceded to popular demands, it was made evident
that only under circumstances in which economic interests are threatened, rather than instances
in which environmental or indigenous rights are involved, was the government willing to rescind
domestically contested mining concessions.
Neoliberal Economic Extractivism
In the previous case studies of Ecuador and Bolivia, the mining conflicts over the right to
use land differed slightly, in that the Ecuadorian conflict arose between locals opposed to
extractivism and foreign corporations, whereas in Bolivia, conflict arose between locals opposed
to extractivism, local miners opposed to foreign industrial extractivism, and foreign corporations.
Both case studies are nevertheless comparable in two ways. Firstly, both domestic and foreign

Mendez 36

focused anti-extraction and anti-industrial extraction movements can be viewed as movements in
favor of post-neoliberal alternative development, according to Escobar’s standard that postneoliberalism ought to “develop infrastructures” that “re-design of social life along non-liberal
and post-capitalist criteria, while retaining their autonomy” (2010, p. 4). Secondly, in both cases,
the organization and response of each government to the grassroots mobilization in each country
was decisive for resolving the competing demands of extractivist development and sustainable
development.
In Ecuador, local indigenous communities refused to consent to private foreign mining
concessions, demanding that the government take into account the environmental impact and
indigenous rights to the land in order to expel the corporate exploration. This resistance took the
form of nationwide protests, physical direct actions such as blockades, and legal appeals,
including court appeals to constitutional law. The central state government responded to these
protests by using its media platforms to discredit protestors as irrational, anti-democratic
terrorists; using its legislative power to criminalize popular forms of protest; and administrative
power to shut down the organizations of the opposition, using the legal grounds of public peace
and state security to justify its actions. Also in the name of national security, the government has
used the military and law enforcement to support private foreign investors, and arresting
opposition leaders, and retroactively charging them with crimes. As a result of the silencing of
protests, the money offered by foreign mining corporations, and the decision of the government
to approve the environmental impact assessment of the mining corporations, the corporations
were supported by the Ecuadorian government and law enforcement, and allowed to begin an ongoing six to eight year-long project to explore the land.
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In Bolivia, local indigenous communities, local miners comprised of mining cooperatives
and traditional miners, and foreign mining corporations vie for the rights to land use, pitting one
group against extraction altogether, while local miners and corporations fight for the right to
extract. This triangle of tension differs from the polar conflict in Ecuador, in that the local miners
comprised of traditional miners and cooperatives are both part of the voting population as well as
part of the economic sector. In Bolivia, similar to their counterparts in Ecuador, the local
indigenous communities opposed mining corporations attempts to purchase their consent, using
direct actions and physical acts such as marches, taking hostages, protests, dynamite and trench
blockades, but relying on the more lenient constitutional requirement of consultation rather than
consent in Bolivia, the government still approved the transfer of communal lands to mining
corporations, sending police forces to gas the indigenous groups and protect the corporation
employees. However, in the face of public pressure, Morales himself later personally decided to
open a dialogue with the community, reverse the concessions, and pardon the protestors, leading
to a victory for the local indigenous communities.
The cooperatives in Bolivia organized the bulk of the local mining opposition to laws
favoring state-sanctioned corporate mining, by organizing strikes, kidnappings, and road
blockages, causing great economic damage. Also, as occurred in Ecuador, the cooperative used
legal arguments based on the constitutional recognition of plural mining rights, or the right to a
diverse mining sector. The government of Bolivia, unlike in Ecuador, actually responded to quell
the organized economic disruptions by amending the law to allow for a more gradual
implementation, but ignored the legal arguments as they continued to put the law in place, and
later retaliated against administrators who had supported previous cooperative efforts to
circumvent the mining laws. Another aspect of the state’s involvement in mining disputes in
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Bolivia concerns the fact that the government has not fully nationalized the mining industry, thus
supporting private sector extraction. Yet, the government responds to economically threatening
conflicts between the traditional and cooperative local miners by nationalizing particular mines,
demonstrating how the state is motivated by preserving state economic interests rather than
promoting the constitutionally protected plural mining.
The Political Left
The leftist political establishments of Ecuador and Bolivia under Correa and Morales
effectively exemplify the left-wing political regimes which came to power throughout 21st
century Latin America, consisting of legal and constitutional frameworks reformed to prioritize
social justice and environmental rights, under the direction of the central state government, with
the power to nationalize industries and enforce policy through military and law enforcement. The
decisions of the leftist political leadership in Bolivia and Ecuador, from the specific construction
of human rights language in the constitution and statutes of the legislature, the related rulings of
the courts, the level of interaction allowed between the executive and the people, and the
summoning of the military, as well as the media, by the government, while not necessarily
dispositive, have been decisive in determining the outcomes of mining conflicts in Ecuador and
Bolivia.
While both Ecuador and Bolivia ratified international conventions regarding indigenous
communal land rights and crafted new constitutions in the twenty-first century providing for
indigenous communal land rights and environmental protections, the rhetoric used in the
Ecuadorian constitution is stronger than the language used in Bolivia. Still, in both countries, the
basic provisions for democratic socialism and pluralism are extant. However, in both countries
the populations have complained that the constitution, while providing nominal
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acknowledgement of values important to the populace, lacks strength in application and
implementation. The tendency of both the Correa and Morales governments, while nominally
leftist, to prioritize foreign investment opportunities over the demands of local communities and
local economic sectors shows both a vagueness and flexibility in the constitution which
diminishes its effectiveness as a means for increasing participation in the political process, and
also the willingness of the supposedly left political establishment to compromise the values of its
electorate.
As mentioned in the earlier review of past scholarship, in discussing the shift to
neoliberalism in the 1990s in Latin America, Charles Hale refers to the economic and political
process of decentralization, minimization of the state, and minimal democratization, with a new
focus on human rights, as neoliberal multiculturalism (2005, p. 12). It has also been stated that
following the subsequent shift to the left in Latin America in the 2000s, many scholars hoped
that the new leftist governments would reverse the market reforms of the 1990s and initiate a
period of post-neoliberalism. Indeed, as aforementioned, Kent Eaton notes that in this period the
governments of Correa and Morales initiated a series of re-nationalizations of private industries,
and recentralization of power in the central state government, as well as a continued stated
commitment towards human rights and social justice (2013, p. 445).
At the very beginning of the twenty-first century, analysts such as Puig argued that
countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador especially exemplified the multicultural state model,
especially concerning the strength of the Bolivian constitution (Puig, 2010), and scholars such as
Vogt concurred that such tolerance in political space had led “most notably [in] Bolivia and
Ecuador,” to “two of the most powerful indigenous movements” in Latin America (Vogt, 2015,
p. 30). However, the case studies of Bolivia and Ecuador in this thesis point to a different
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development in this trend, in which the process of recentralization and enlargement of the power
and centrality of the central state government, while leftist, culminated in the support of the
neoliberal extractivist economic order, continuing to allow for private mining concessions for
foreign ventures to the detriment of local and indigenous communities.
VIII.

Conclusion
In this study, the relationship between neoliberal economics and leftist political regimes

in Latin America was analyzed within the arena of mining conflicts in Bolivia and Ecuador. By
analyzing the ways in which the Ecuadorian government suppressed local grassroots resistance
to industrial extraction projects, compared with the ways in which the Bolivian government has
dealt with competing claims over natural resource extraction and use, this study isolated and
compared the variations between the political institutions of two different leftist Latin American
governments and analyzed the outcomes of these similar yet varied political regimes.
Specifically, this thesis looks at how left-wing political actions impeded anti-mining activists in
Ecuador and Bolivia from achieving a post-neoliberal economic order with sustainable
development, in spite of grassroots efforts resisting neo-extractivism and global neoliberalism in
general.
The Correa and Morales governments demonstrate the ability and willingness of leftleaning nation-states, even those run by governments purportedly committed to radical left-wing,
post-neoliberalism, to deepen rhetorical acknowledgement of diverse cultures and increase
participation in the political process, while maintaining the economic and material systems of
neoliberalism in place. In Ecuador, the government was unmoved by the opposition of local
indigenous communities to mining corporations based on legal petitions for communal land
rights. In Bolivia, the government similarly denied such petitions, while later on responding to
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local demands for mining reform only when key economic interests were threatened by the
opposition, or when Morales himself felt personally compelled to open dialogue with the
community.
In other words, the constitutional and legal changes initiated by the leftist governments of
two of the most radially-oriented states in Latin America failed to accomplish the political left’s
goals to promote social, cultural, and environmental rights. Centralizing power in the offices of
the nation-state central government, in spite of electing left-wing and/or indigenous
representatives to those offices and recrafting the constitutional frameworks of those nations to
recognize social rights, is not sufficient to confer autonomy, decision-making power, nor
sovereignty in the hands of the indigenous local communities and local economic actors. Both
state governments in Bolivia and Ecuador, although running on anti-neoliberal platforms,
remained committed to the free-market logic of neo-extractivism. Under both Correa and
Morales, left-leaning regimes in Latin America prioritize international economic regimes over
both domestic and international political conventions designed to promote environmental and
indigenous rights, demonstrating their commitment to the neoliberal economic order.
Discussing the hegemony of Western political institutions throughout the world, Dipesh
Chakrabarty criticizes the “universalization of the nation-state as the most desirable form of
political community,” specifically inculpating “‘economics’ and ‘history’ [as] the knowledge
forms that correspond to the two major institutions that the rise (and later universalization) of the
bourgeoisie order has given to the world- the capitalist mode of production and the nation-state”
(2008). Conversely, the decision of both the left-leaning Bolivian and Ecuadorian nation-state
governments to reinforce the neoliberal order in the mining industry suggest that not only has
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neoliberal economic doctrine had a hand in shaping political projects, but the leftist political
leaders in turn have also tended to sustain the neoliberal economic order.
The cases of Correa and Morales are indicative of two characteristics of leftist political
regimes in Latin America, that they are largely oriented towards economic organization, and that
they are very amenable to the tides of international trends. For leftist Latin American
governments to be truly oriented towards post-neoliberal alternatives of governance, they may
therefore have to look towards first restructuring their political organization by decentralizing the
decision making authority to more local leaders; as Puig suggested, post-neoliberal projects may
look to “rethinking the notions of citizenship and democracy, given that the forms of tenure and
management of land are central not only for the survival of indigenous peoples, but also for the
reproduction of their cultures” (Puig p. 84). Likewise, if Latin American peoples are to survive
the hegemony of globalization and sustain a post-neoliberal society based on social justice and
sustainable development, they may need to rethink their membership in a community of nationstates dependent on international trade relations and neoliberal capitalism, as these countries
continue to espouse free-market logic despite persisting levels of inequality. Further research
ought to examine further conflicts over land use to determine the extent to which leftist state
governments support local community concerns or industrial business concerns. By delving into
the ways in which governments are able to circumvent grassroots interests, as well as
documenting and publicizing such interests, political actors may be better able to hold state
leaders accountable to their campaign promises and leftist party goals.
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